Peer-Reviewed Publications
Tariffs and Corporate Political Activity: A Survey Experiment on U.S. Businesses with Robert M. Kubinec, Daniel L. Nielson, and Jiakun J. Zhang, Business and Politics, online first view. (2025) [gated] [Monkey Cage]
Migration and Development Finance: A Survey Experiment on Diaspora Members with Alexandra O. Zeitz, Review of International Organizations 19(2): 185-215. (2024) [gated]
Low-Skilled Liberalizers: Support for Free Trade in Africa with Helen V. Milner, International Organization 77(4): 848-870. (2023) [open access]
Mutual Gain or Resource Drain? Attitudes Toward International Financial Assistance During the Early COVID-19 Pandemic with Quynh Nguyen, International Interactions 47(6): 1131-1150. (2021) [gated]
The Effects of Rejecting Aid on Recipients’ Reputations: Evidence from Natural Disasters with Allison Carnegie, Review of International Organizations 16: 495-519. (2021) [gated] [paper] [appendix]
Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking with Richard Clark, American Journal of Political Science 65(1): 36-51. (2021) [gated] [AJPS blog]
Rethinking Foreign Aid and Government Legitimacy: Views from Aid Recipients in Kenya, Studies in Comparative International Development 55(2): 143-159. (2020) [gated]
Global Patterns of Renewable Energy Innovation, 1990 to 2009 with Patrick Bayer and Johannes Urpelainen, Energy for Sustainable Development, 17(3). (2013) [gated]
Under Review
Accountable to Whom? Public Opinion of Aid Conditionality in Recipient Countries with Richard Clark and Alexandra O. Zeitz [paper] (R&R at International Studies Quarterly)
When donors extend foreign aid, they often attach requirements. While requirements are intended to generate desirable policy reforms, they make recipient governments accountable to donors in addition to their citizens. How does the public in recipient countries view these requirements attached to development finance? We argue that individuals’ assessment of aid requirements is a function of their trust in their own government and the foreign donor. When citizens trust their government, aid requirements activate sovereignty concerns, and individuals view them negatively. But when individuals distrust their government, they see requirements as a source of external accountability. Citizens also consider the donor; foreign accountability is welcome only if the donor is trusted. We test our argument using Afrobarometer data on public attitudes toward aid conditionality and an original survey fielded in Kenya, finding evidence that supports our contentions. Our study contributes to an understanding of accountability in global governance.
Trade Smarts: How Knowledge Informs Trade Policy Preferences in Sub-Saharan Africa with Richard Clark and Alexandra O. Zeitz
What explains support for trade liberalization, especially in the developing world? Research on trade attitudes in the US and Europe suggests that individuals' trade preferences often diverge from economic theory due to informational gaps, but much less is known about developing countries. We argue that trade holds greater salience for individuals in developing countries due to their heightened exposure to economic integration, allowing them to form economically coherent preferences. To test this supposition, we field an original survey in Ghana. Our study specifically examines whether knowledge about foreign trade and awareness of trading partners moderate the relationship between factor endowments and trade attitudes. After first establishing that low-skilled respondents are more supportive of trade (consistent with factor endowment theory), we then show that the relationship is stronger for knowledgeable respondents and varies in logical ways depending on the trading partner. Overall, our project illustrates that economically logical preferences on trade exist, and they may be more prevalent in the developing world.
Working Papers
Individuals in Institutions: Evidence from the World Bank and IMF with Richard Clark and Kolby Hanson
Bureaucratic Influence in International Relations with Richard Clark and Tyler Jost
The Microfoundations of Geopolitical Influence in International Financial Institutions with Richard Clark
Dance Partners Matter: Client Country Bureaucrats and the World Bank with Cleo O’Brien-Udry
Drafts available upon request.
Book Project
Deciding Development: How International Organizations Classify and Create Developing Countries
International organizations change the world not only through money or laws but also through seemingly trivial activities. Using both observational and experimental approaches, this book shows that how international bureaucrats formally classify “developing countries” profoundly shapes how those countries are perceived and treated by influential actors in the global economy. Country classifications shape the aid, credit ratings, and democracy ratings countries receive. Increasingly, these consequences are felt even by domestic actors, who regularly interact directly with international elites. Focusing on the World Bank’s income classification system and the UN’s Least Developed Country category, this book explains why elite global actors rely on these classifications and who wins and loses as a result. Deliberately or inadvertently, for better or for worse, bureaucrats in international organizations exert considerable influence through their day-to-day activities. These findings will be of interest to development practitioners and students of international organizations in an age of measurement and metrics.